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This paper argues that the CHREST architecture of cognition 
can shed important light on developing artificial general 
intelligence. The key theme is that “cognition is perception.” 
The description of the main components and mechanisms of 
the architecture is followed by a discussion of several domains 
where CHREST has already been successfully applied, such 
as the psychology of expert behaviour, the acquisition of 
language by children, and the learning of multiple 
representations in physics. The characteristics of CHREST 
that enable it to account for empirical data include: self-
organisation, an emphasis on cognitive limitations, the 
presence of a perception-learning cycle, and the use of 
naturalistic data as input for learning. We argue that some of 
these characteristics can help shed light on the hard questions 
facing theorists developing artificial general intelligence, such 
as intuition, the acquisition and use of concepts, and the role 
of embodiment. 
Introduction 
There are two main broad approaches for developing general 
artificial intelligence. The first is to use whatever techniques 
are offered by computer science and artificial intelligence, 
including brute force, to create artefacts that behave in an 
intelligent way. The second is to develop computational 
architectures that closely simulate human behaviour in a 
variety of domains. Examples of this approach include ACT-
R (Anderson and Lebière, 1998), Soar (Newell, 1990), and 
EPAM (Feigenbaum and Simon, 1984). More recently, the 
computational architecture CHREST (Chunk Hierarchy and 
REtrieval Structures) (Gobet et al., 2001; Gobet and Simon, 
2000; Lane, Cheng, and Gobet, 2000) has simulated data in a 
number of domains, including expert behaviour in board 
games, problem solving in physics, first language 
acquisition, and implicit learning.  
The strength of cognitive architectures is that their 
implementation as computer programs ensures a high degree 
of precision, and offers a sufficiency proof that the 
mechanisms proposed can carry out the tasks under study – 
something obviously desirable if artificial general 
intelligence is the goal. The extent to which success is 
reached in simulating actual human behaviour can be 
assessed by using measures such as eye movements, reaction 
times, and error patterns. 
The aim of this paper is to introduce CHREST, to 
illustrate the kind of phenomena it has already been able to 
successfully simulate, and to show what insight it offers on 
the creation of AI systems displaying general intelligence. 
The claim made here is that developing a cognitive 
architecture – and thus understanding human intelligence – 
provides critical insight for developing general artificial 
intelligence.  
The CHREST Architecture 
Just like its predecessor, EPAM (Elementary Memorizer and 
Perceiver) (Feigenbaum and Simon, 1984), CHREST 
assumes the presence of short-term memory (STM) and 
long-term memory (LTM) structures, and models cognition 
as the product of the interaction of perceptual learning, 
memory retrieval, and decision-making processes. A central 
theme is that “cognition is perception” (De Groot and Gobet, 
1996). Thus, the architecture postulates a close interaction 
between perception, learning, and memory: CHREST’s 
knowledge directs attention and perception, and, in turn, 
perception directs the learning of new knowledge.  
Another essential aspect of the architecture is that 
Simon’s assumption of bounded rationality (Simon, 1969) is 
taken very seriously. For example, CHREST’s behaviour is 
constrained by the limited capacity of visual short-term 
memory (3 chunks), the relatively slow rate at which new 
elements can be learned (8 seconds to create a new chunk), 
and the time it takes to transfer information from LTM to 
STM (50 ms). Just like the human cognitive system, 
CHREST satisfices, and this might be a key condition for 
displaying general intelligence. All cognitive operations 
carried out by the system have a cost, which is indicated with 
approximate but fixed time parameters. The presence of 
these parameters enables close comparison between human 
and simulated behaviour (see De Groot and Gobet, 1996, for 
details; a technical specification of CHREST can be found at 
www.CHREST.info).  
The emphasis on cognitive limitations is in stark contrast 
with architectures such as Soar, where the stress is on 
carrying out complex intelligent behaviour without imposing 
many constraints on the architecture (for example, Soar 
enjoys an unlimited capacity for its working memory). 
Compared to other architectures, CHREST might thus appear 
as a very austere system. However, it is also a powerful 
dynamic system governed not only by built-in capabilities 
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but also, more importantly, by the complexities of its 
interaction with the environment. Together, these features 
enable it to cover a wide range of behaviours. 
Components 
The three main components of CHREST are shown in Figure 
1: (a) mechanisms and structures for interacting with the 
external world; (b) multiple STMs that hold information 
from varied input modalities; and (c) an LTM, which holds 
information is in a “chunking network.” A chunking network 
is a discrimination network whose dynamic growth is a joint 
function of the previous states of the system and the inputs 
from the environment. The visual input-output channels (and 
the STM associated with them) have been investigated in 
models of chess expertise where the actual eye movements of 
masters and novices have been simulated (De Groot and 
Gobet, 1996). In general, this simulated eye is crucial in 
understanding the interaction between low-level information, 
such as visual stimuli, and high-level cognition, such as 
concepts. The auditory channels have been investigated in a 
model of vocabulary acquisition (Jones, Gobet and Pine, 
2007, 2008), which simulates the way children learn words 
using phonemic information.  
 















Figure 1. Key components of the CHREST architecture 
Learning Mechanisms 
Chunking networks are grown by mechanisms similar to 
those used in EPAM. A process called discrimination creates 
new nodes and a process called familiarisation incrementally 
adds information to existing nodes. An important extension, 
compared to EPAM, is a mechanism for creating high-level 
structures from perceptual information, by a process called 
template formation. The creation of a template, which is a 
kind of schema, uses both stable information (for creating its 
core) and variable information (for creating its slots). 
Templates are essential for explaining how chess Masters 
can recall briefly presented positions relatively well, even 
with a presentation time as short as 1 or 2 seconds (Gobet 
and Simon, 2000). They are also important for explaining 
how chess masters carry out planning – that is search at a 
level higher than that of moves. Another important novelty is 
the creation of lateral links (similarity links, production 
links, equivalence links, and generative links) between nodes 
(see Gobet et al., 2001, for detail). It is important to point out 
that all these mechanisms are carried out automatically. 
Much more than with previous chunking models (for 
example, Simon and Gilmartin, 1973), CHREST explains the 
development of expertise by both acquiring a large number 
of knowledge structures and building connections between 
them.  
Eye Movements and the Perception-Learning Cycle 
The frame problem is a central issue in cognitive science and 
artificial intelligence: How can a system notice the relevant 
changes in the environment in real time whilst ignoring the 
indefinite number of changes that are irrelevant? CHREST’s 
solution consists of three parts, which all lead to a reduction 
in information. First, the limited capacity of the visual field 
eliminates a considerable amount of information coming 
from the environment. Second, the knowledge that the 
system brings to bear – and sometimes the lack of such 
knowledge – further constrains the amount of information 
processed. Third, the limited memory capacity we have 
mentioned earlier causes a further reduction of information. 
Thus, CHREST is highly selective, as presumably is the 
human cognitive system. This is consistent with research on 
perception and evolution, which has shown that animals and 
humans in particular have evolved powerful perceptual 
mechanisms for extracting key features from sensations in 
order to survive complex and dangerous environments. 
Indeed, with CHREST, the link between perception and 
cognition is so tight that the distinction between these two 
sets of mechanisms all but disappears. To begin with, the 
focus of attention determines what information will be 
learned. Then, when possible, eye movements and thus 
attention will be directed by previous knowledge, making it 
more likely that the system pays attention to critical 
information. The key assumption here is that features that 
were important in the past – to the point that they led to 
learning – should be important in the future as well. This 
perception-learning-perception cycle is another way by 
which CHREST addresses the frame problem, as it leads to a 
selectivity of attention that further reduces the amount of 
information extracted from the environment and makes it 
possible to respond in real time. 
Some Domains Modelled by CHREST 
Chess Expertise 
Historically, chess has been a standard domain for studying 
cognition, including intelligence, both for humans and 
computers. Chess was the first domain of application of   
CHREST, a domain that turned out to be excellent as it 
engages various cognitive abilities including perception, 
memory, decision making, and problem solving. It turns out 
that CHREST can simulate a large number of phenomena 
related to chess expertise. These include: the eye movements 
of novices and chess Masters (see Figure 2); recall 
performance in numerous memory experiments (including 
errors and the detail of the piece placements); and evolution 
Published by Atlantis Press, © the authors 
                              2
of look-ahead search as a function of skill (De Groot and 
Gobet, 1996; Gobet, 1997; Gobet and Simon, 1996, 2000). 
The main mechanism explaining these phenomena is the 
acquisition of a large number of chunks (more than 300,000 
for simulating Grandmasters) and templates, which are 
autonomously acquired from scanning master-level games.  
 
CHREST Master Human Master 
260 msec mean 272 msec 
100 msec 
sd 97 msec 
 
Figure 2. Example of a Master’s eye movements (left) and their 
simulations by CHREST (right). The mean and the standard 
deviation of fixation times are across all positions and all master 
subjects. (After De Groot and Gobet, 1996.) 
 
Computational modelling is often criticised by describing 
it as only some kind of curve-fitting exercise, without new 
predictions and thus without real understanding. CHREST 
does not suffer from this weakness, as it has made a number 
of new predictions, some of which have been later confirmed 
by empirical data. A good example of this is the recall of 
random chess positions, which are constructed by 
haphazardly replacing the pieces of a game position on the 
board. When these simulations were carried out, the 
universal belief, based on research by Chase and Simon 
(1973) with a small sample, was that there was no skill 
difference in the recall of random positions, while of course 
Masters vastly outperform weaker players with game 
positions.  The simulations repeatedly showed that there 
should also be a skill effect with this type of positions – for 
the simple reason that CHREST could recognize some 
chunks in random positions, just by chance, and that this was 
more likely with large networks of chunks. This prediction 
was verified by a re-analysis of all studies carried out with 
this type of material and by collecting new data (Gobet and 
Simon, 1996). Figure 3 shows the predictions of CHREST 
and the human data, for both game and random positions. 
(Please note the close fit between CHREST and the human 
data.) CHREST’s predictions were also supported when 
random positions were created using different procedures 
(Gobet and Waters, 2003). 
These results indicate that Masters perceive patterns in 
spite of the fact that the positions do not contain much 
structure, a further indication, if necessary, that chunking 
mechanisms are automatic and implicit. If this is the case, 
CHREST should be able to simulate the kind of phenomena 
observed in the implicit learning literature (Reber, 1967). In 
an implicit-learning experiment, stimuli generated from an 
artificial grammar are first shown to the subjects, and then 
subjects have to classify new strings as well-formed or not. 
The debate in this literature is whether subjects learn 
anything in these experiments, and, if so, what kind of things 
are learnt: rules, fragments, or exemplars? Unpublished work 
with Daniel Freudenthal indicates that CHREST can simulate 
some of the key results very well, suggesting that subjects in 
these experiments learn implicitly and unconsciously small 



























1,000 chunks 10,000 chu nks 100,000 chunks
 
Figure 3. Memory for game and random positions as a function of 
skill level. The human data are the average results aggregated 
across 13 studies. (After Gobet and Simon, 1996.) 
 
Of course, the essence of chess skill is not to memorize 
chess positions, but to find good moves. Work has also been 
done with CHREST to understand how human masters are 
able to find good moves despite searching only one very 
small subset of the search space. A first program inspired by 
CHREST, CHUMP (CHUnking of Moves and Patterns; 
Gobet and Jansen, 1994), was able to learn an association of 
chess moves to perceptual patterns. It is interesting that 
CHUMP, while playing at a fairly low level, performed 
better in positions requiring a ‘positional judgement’ than in 
tactical positions, which engage more look-ahead search. As 
positional judgment in chess is seen as a clear-cut example of 
intuition (e.g., Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986), it could be argued 
that CHUMP captures this aspect of human intelligence (see 
also Simon, 1979). A second program, SEARCH (Gobet, 
1997), simulated key parameters of the way human of 
different levels search a position. These parameters included 
depth of search, width of search, and rate at which moves 
were generated. More recent work with CHREST has added 
mechanisms combining look-ahead search and pattern 
recognition, paving the way to complete simulation of 
expertise in chess.  
Other Domains of Expertise 
An application of CHREST to the African game of Awele 
(Gobet, 2009) shows that it can play at a fairly good level by 
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pattern recognition only, while at the same time simulating 
several results from memory-recall experiments. Simulations 
have also been carried out on memory for computer 
programs and the acquisition of multiple representations in 
physics. In this latter work, the aim was to study the 
acquisition of multiple diagrammatic representations, and the 
combination of these multiple representations to form 
problem-solving stages. The representations were, first, the 
classic circuit-style of representation, found in textbooks, and 
second, a specialized problem-solving representation, 
containing quantitative properties of the domain (see Lane et 
al., 2000 for details). The essential elements of the model 
here were the movements of the eye and visual short-term 
memory; some chunks were learnt for each representation, 
and they were combined within short-term memory using 
lateral links. These links are used in solving new problems, 
to retrieve known components of a problem. 
 Although simple in comparison to the abilities of ACT-R 
or Soar, this work provides CHREST with a rather unique 
form of problem solving, based around perceptual chunks.  
The idea is that problem solutions are planned, at a high 
level, by retrieving familiar chunks; these familiar chunks 
have been acquired by solving smaller problems in isolation.  
The solution process involves a form of composition, guided 
by the perceived separation of the problem into chunks.  The 
decomposition used by CHREST corresponds with that used 
and drawn by human participants, providing empirical 
support for the role of perceptual chunks in problem solving.  
Linking Perception to Expectations 
Perception in CHREST is seen as a cycle, with the eye 
guided to look at parts of the scene or image where useful 
information is expected to lie.  With human, and perhaps 
animal, cognition, it is expected that such expectations would 
be formed from information in more than one modality.  For 
example, knowing a sequence of verbal statements may help 
guide the location of a sequence of perceptual icons.   
 Lane, Sykes and Gobet (2003) explored this aspect of 
cognition by training CHREST to encode information in 
more than one modality: visual and verbal.  The process is 
illustrated by Figure 4.  Here, one visual and one verbal 
stimulus are separately experienced and sorted through the 
long-term memory.  Pointers to the retrieved chunks are 
placed into short-term memory.  Because short-term memory 
is separated for each modality, the information about visual 
and verbal chunks is kept distinct.  An association is then 
made between the visual and verbal memories.   
 The interaction between the two memories produces 
various measurable effects.  For instance, prior expectations 
can improve the speed and accuracy with which unclear 
stimuli are recognised.  The ultimate aim is to understand 
how low-level and high-level knowledge interact to produce 
intelligent behaviour, a question that has nagged cognitive 
science for decades (for example, Neisser, 1966).  
 Current work is looking to apply chunking mechanisms to 
bitmap-level data, whilst maintaining interactions between 
verbal and visuo-spatial information.  One technique for 
doing so lies in employing techniques from component-based 
vision, where one layer of feature detectors seeks out 
symbolic features to pass to a second layer.  For example, 
Han et al. (2009) employ support-vector machines to locate 
components of a human face, which are then classified by a 
separate classifier.  A natural extension is to use CHREST as 
the second layer, and so gain the benefits both of low-level 
pixel analysis and high-level symbolic pattern matching 
across multiple representations. 
 
 
Figure 4. Learning to link information across two modalities. (1) 
The visual pattern is sorted through LTM, and a pointer to the node 
retrieved placed into visual STM. (2) The verbal pattern is sorted 
through LTM, and a pointer to the node retrieved placed into verbal 
STM. (3) A naming link is formed between the two nodes at the top 
of the STMs. (After Lane, Sykes and Gobet, 2003.) 
 
Acquisition of Language 
Language is uniquely human, and understanding how 
children acquire their first language will tell us something 
important about intelligence in general. We see language 
acquisition as one type of expertise, and argue that children 
become experts in their native language through implicitly 
acquiring a large number of chunks and links between them. 
A first variation of CHREST has studied the acquisition of 
vocabulary (Jones et al., 2007). The interest has been on how 
mechanisms in short-term memory and long-term memory 
interact through the creation and use of chunks. A second 
variation of CHREST, known as MOSAIC (Model of Syntax 
Acquisition In Children), has simulated with great success a 
number of empirical phenomena in the early acquisition of 
syntactic categories (Freudenthal et al., 2008, 2009). Our 
attention has focused on the “optional infinitive” 
phenomenon and related phenomena, such as the misuse of 
pronouns. The “optional infinitive” phenomenon concerns 
typical errors made by children in their use of finite (for 
example, goes, went) and non-finite verb forms (for example, 
go, going). For example, a child would say “her do it” 
instead of “she does it.” A combination of four features 
makes the MOSAIC project unique within cognitive science: 
(a) it uses naturalistic input (utterances spoken by parents 
interacting with their children in a play setting); (b) it can 
simulate in detail the pattern and developmental trend of 
errors; (c) it uses exactly the same model for reproducing a 
number of empirical phenomena; and (d) it carries out 
simulations in several languages (so far, English, Dutch, 
German, French, Spanish; and Q'anjobalan, a Mayan 
language) with exactly the same model – the only difference 
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being the maternal  input used for training. Compared to 
other approaches in the field (e.g., connectionism), the extent 
of MOSAIC’s coverage is striking, in particular when one 
considers that only simple and local learning mechanisms are 
used. In a nutshell, three interacting factors are essential for 
explaining MOSAIC’s behaviour: rote learning, the creation 
and use of generative links, and the statistical structure of the 
input. 
General Intelligence: Some Central Questions 
Although CHREST does not yet show fully general 
intelligence, it offers a cognitive architecture whose 
combined components have proved sufficient to exhibit 
behaviour that is, in several domains, remarkably close to 
human behaviour. In this final section, we explore some 
central questions in artificial intelligence and cognitive 
science for which, we believe, CHREST provides important 
insight.  
The Role of Concepts  
It is generally accepted that acquiring and using concepts is 
essential for the survival of organisms and their successful 
interaction with the environment. Without concepts, 
organisms can show only primitive behaviour, as the lack of 
generalization means that each new exemplar must be treated 
separately. A considerable amount of experimental research 
has been carried out on concept formation and categorization 
in psychology over the last decades. We know a great deal 
about how people acquire and utilise concepts, with a 
number of computational models accounting for different 
aspects of these empirical data. For example, Gobet et al. 
(1997) used a model close to CHREST to investigate the role 
of strategies in concept formation, and the suitability of 
CHREST for simulating categorization experiments was 
further established by Lane and Gobet (2005). 
 The previous simulations with CHREST have essentially 
relied on individual nodes to account for the concepts used 
by humans. However, the type of chunking networks created 
by CHREST suggests other possibilities as well. A natural 
interpretation of these networks is that concepts do not map 
into single chunks (or even single templates), but rather 
correspond to a subset of nodes interlinked, to varying 
degrees, by lateral links. In this view, concepts are much 
more distributed than in standard symbolic models, and take 
on some of the flavour of how concepts are represented in 
connectionist networks; this idea is expanded upon in Lane, 
Gobet and Cheng (2000). While this idea is not new, the 
advantage of using CHREST is to provide mechanisms 
explaining how nodes and the links between them are 
acquired autonomously and in real time, how they relate to 
perceptual input, how they are influenced by the structure of 
the environment, and how they may integrate information 
across different modalities. 
Embodiment 
Although the first experiments with autonomous robots are 
fairly old, going back to Grey Walter’s (1953) seminal work, 
it is only in the last twenty years or so that the field of 
embodied cognition has been taken up. A number of mobile 
robots have been created that are able to carry out fairly 
simple tasks (Pfeifer and Scheier, 1999). However, as we 
have argued elsewhere (Lane and Gobet, 2001), a limitation 
of current research in this field is that it does not provide 
mechanisms for how simple behaviours can be linked with 
more complex behaviours. The limitation is serious, as it is 
obvious that systems showing general intelligence must have 
(at least) these two levels of complexity. Specifically, the 
lack of symbolic processing in current embodied-cognition 
systems means that there are important limits in the kind of 
behaviours that can be addressed.  
 As soon as one tries to link simple behaviours with 
symbolic processes, the question of symbol grounding arises. 
The CHREST framework provides a fairly simple 
explanation for this: as noted above, symbols, that is chunks, 
are grounded through perception. Importantly, as mentioned 
above, this idea goes much beyond that of simply linking 
symbols to external objects, through perception. Chunks also 
shape how the world is perceived, in two important ways. 
First, they determine how percepts will be organized. The 
way former world chess champion Gary Kasparov 
perceptually groups information of a chess position is 
different from the way an amateur does. Second, chunks 
actively direct eye movements and thus determine to which 
part of the display attention will be heeded. 
 To show how such an integrated system would work, we 
are currently working to implement CHREST into a mobile 
robot.  Our first aim is to show that a chunking-based 
architecture can replicate some of the 'classic' simulations in 
the literature, such as the avoidance of obstacles and the 
emergence of complex behaviour.  Our belief is that 
combining symbolic and non-symbolic approaches within an 
embodied system is likely to have important consequences, 
both for theory and application.  In particular, symbolic 
information will enable the robot to be 'articulate', 
explaining, verbally, what and why it takes particular 
decisions. 
Conclusion 
We have argued that progress towards understanding general 
intelligence requires an integrated approach: not just 
integrating perception with learning, but also integrating 
high-level and low-level modes of processing.  It is unlikely 
that a satisfactory theory of human intelligence will be 
developed from a single explanatory framework, so we 
expect an artificial system with claims to general intelligence 
to be a unification of diverse approaches.   
 In this paper, we have set out the case for a symbolic 
system, which integrates perception with learning.  We have 
shown how the system captures many details of high-level 
processing in human cognition, and also how it captures 
physical behaviours, such as details of eye fixations.  These 
successes allow us to propose some ideas of how a complete 
model of the mind may look.   
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 Central would be a two-way interaction between 
perception and cognition.  This interaction must be coupled 
with an incremental learning system, capable of acquiring a 
vast and coherent structure of nodes and links.  But also, 
paradoxically perhaps, the architecture should exhibit strong 
constraints, such as limited processing time or short-term 
memory capacities.  These limits lie behind some of the key 
empirical challenges to computational theories of 
psychological behaviour. 
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